Evolutionary game analysis of pirate attack based on prospect theory

Pirate attacks are related to shipping safety, international trade order, and regional political stability. How to effectively address this problem has become a pressing issue that the international community needs to tackle urgently. This study constructs a three-player evolutionary game model involving shipping companies, pirates, and the government. It analyzes the strategic evolution and interaction mechanisms of each subject in the context of pirate attacks. Based on prospect theory, this study employs MATLAB simulation experiments and sensitivity analysis to investigate the impact of subjective factors, such as risk aversion, on the strategic choices of each player. The results show that: (1) The key to effectively curbing piracy is to increase the intensity of crackdowns on its crimes to reduce its illegal profit expectations; (2) Shipping companies show a strong risk aversion tendency in the game, and they tend to equip defensive equipment even if the probability of pirate attacks is very low; (3) The government’s perceived value sensitivity coefficient threshold is the highest. Only when it has a stronger risk perception and strategy adjustment capabilities can it adjust its escort policy promptly in response to pirate attacks. This study can provide theoretical support and decision-making reference for the formulation of quantitative representation of cross-border governance modesce policies.